Posts Tagged ‘censorship’

Censorship is alive and well in Britain today

April 5, 2014 1 comment

Last week I proposed an experiment. Index on Censorship had discussed what it calls ‘censorship by omission’; suggesting that a form of censorship exists in Britain through simple lack of information. This is censorship by omission rather than censorship by suppression.

At the same time, Der Spiegel published details from the Snowden files indicating that GCHQ had been involved in hacking German satellite communications companies. Glenn Greenwald described it in The Intercept:

One undated document shows how British GCHQ operatives hacked into the computer servers of the German satellite communications providers Stellar and Cetel, and also targeted IABG, a security contractor and communications equipment provider with close ties to the German government. The document outlines how GCHQ identified these companies’ employees and customers, making lists of emails that identified network engineers and chief executives. It also suggests that IABG’s networks may have been “looked at” by the NSA’s Network Analysis Center.

My ‘experiment’ was simple. We know that the UK government has been trying to suppress reporting on GCHQ revelations through its involvement in the physical destruction of hard disks at The Guardian. So, I suggested, “Over the next few days it will be worth seeing just how much coverage this very major, very important story actually generates in the British mainstream press.”

The result? None.

It’s not a scientific experiment because I haven’t read all of the British mainstream national press from cover to cover since that time. Instead, this morning I used Google and searched on keywords from the Greenwald paragraph:

GCHQ Stellar Cetel IABG germany satellite communications

Searching the web got 3390 returns. In the top four pages (that’s all I checked) there is no single national British newspaper included. (My ‘experiment’ came in at #10, last on the first page.)

Searching the news had just five hits: Register, Help Net Security, IT News, TIME and Engadget.

Nothing whatsoever from any of the British national press.

The conclusion has to be that Britain suffers under a regime of censorship by omission. What we don’t know is how much of this ‘omission’ is effected by government pressure, nor whether Google has been persuaded to reduce the search rankings of any published articles — making it actually censorship by suppression.

Categories: All, Politics, Security Issues

Britain: a land of censorship by omission

March 29, 2014 Leave a comment

Let’s all try a little experiment.

Index on Censorship warned today about what it calls ‘censorship by omission’ in the UK. The suggestion is not that the British are told what to think by the UK press, but that they are controlled over what they are allowed to think about. It suggests that serious news can be omitted from print while newspapers guide their readers to less important, or even old, news.

The British news spectrum was recently obsessed with Labour politicians Harriet Harman and Patricia Hewitt, who worked for the National Council for Civil Liberties (now ‘Liberty’) in the 1970s. That council granted affiliate status to the now-banned Paedophile Information Exchange (PIE). The Daily Mail made a huge splash about its PIE investigation in February, despite uncovering no new information. That paper alone had reported the same story in 1983, 2009, 2012 and 2013. Eventually the BBC, online world and print media all covered the controversy, meaning more worthy issues lost precedence.
British news blind spots: Omission and obscurity

The result, warns Index on Censorship, is a form of censorship by omission:

We’re denied investigation or campaigning on vital issues because nobody knows they exist.

So here’s our experiment. Let’s see over the next few days just how much coverage we get on the Snowden files released today by Der Spiegel. Quoted by Glenn Greenwald’s new publication, The Intercept, this includes:

One undated document shows how British GCHQ operatives hacked into the computer servers of the German satellite communications providers Stellar and Cetel, and also targeted IABG, a security contractor and communications equipment provider with close ties to the German government. The document outlines how GCHQ identified these companies’ employees and customers, making lists of emails that identified network engineers and chief executives. It also suggests that IABG’s networks may have been “looked at” by the NSA’s Network Analysis Center.

The ultimate aim of GCHQ was to obtain information that could help the spies infiltrate “teleport” satellites sold by these companies that send and receive data over the Internet. The document notes that GCHQ hoped to identify “access chokepoints” as part of a wider effort alongside partner spy agencies to “look at developing possible access opportunities” for surveillance.

In other words, infiltrating these companies was viewed as a means to an end for the British agents. Their ultimate targets were likely the customers. Cetel’s customers, for instance, include governments that use its communications systems to connect to the Internet in Africa and the Middle East. Stellar provides its communications systems to a diverse range of customers that could potentially be of interest to the spies – including multinational corporations, international organizations, refugee camps, and oil drilling platforms.
Der Spiegel: NSA Put Merkel on List of 122 Targeted Leaders

So let’s be very clear here. This is a direct accusation that GCHQ has been hacking into the telecommunications products of friendly companies in allied nations. Over the next few days it will be worth seeing just how much coverage this very major, very important story actually generates in the British mainstream press.

Here’s my prediction — and I genuinely hope I am proved very wrong: there will be serious coverage in the Guardian and Independent (read by very few who don’t already know that GCHQ is hack-crazy and law-breaking); some coverage in the Telegraph (read by hardly anyone); dismissive, brief coverage by the BBC; and preciously little else.

Let’s see.

Categories: All, Politics, Security Issues

British government and Google both use ‘filtering’ as a pretext for censorship

January 5, 2014 Leave a comment

On Friday Laurie Penny wrote a piece in the Guardian’s Comment is Free: David Cameron’s internet porn filter is the start of censorship creep. The gist is that under the guise of protecting children, Cameron’s government is intent on controlling adults.

For example, she wrote:

The category of “obscene content”, for instance, which is blocked even on the lowest setting of BT’s opt-in filtering system, covers “sites with information about illegal manipulation of electronic devices [and] distribution of software” – in other words, filesharing and music downloads, debate over which has been going on in parliament for years. It looks as if that debate has just been bypassed entirely, by way of scare stories about five-year-olds and fisting videos. Whatever your opinion on downloading music and cartoons for free, doing so is neither obscene nor pornographic.

But we should not be surprised. Filtering has always been used as a disguise for censorship – and not just by governments. For example, I recently emailed Alexander Hanff, a well-known privacy expert and advocate, for his views on the GDPR (specifically for an article I was writing at the time). He replied, but with this surprising comment:


‘Nothing to do with me, guv,’ I quickly replied. Well, he looked into it, and to cut a long story short (you can read the full version on his blog: Gmail scanning becomes censorship), he came to the conclusion that Google is effectively using ‘privacy’ as a trip for its spam block.

Alexander gives several reasons why this email could not be considered spam by any half-decent filter: it was clearly a reply; it included his PGP key; and it included both a delivery and a read receipt. His conclusion:

What makes this even more ironic, is the email content was all about an EU Regulation of which Google would be one of the corporations it impacts most – an email about privacy, scanned by a filter which goes against privacy and run by a company that has declared war on privacy because this single, fundamental right interferes with their illegitimate and unethical revenue model.

Alexander’s conclusion is that this was incompetence, ironic incompetence, bordering on censorship. But it’s a fine line – and personally, I’m not so sure. Google’s filters are essential to its business model. It cannot afford to get them wrong. And its revenue record demonstrates that it doesn’t get it far wrong. A little tweak here, and a little tweak there, and Cameron’s ability to censor anything he wants becomes a simple reality.

And as far as I can see, Google is already testing out its model. In this instance it was an inoffensive email to a journalist about the GDPR. But filtering and blocking emails to journalists is a worrying trend with worrying potential.

Categories: All, Politics, Security Issues

If I choose the light, am I censoring the dark?

October 15, 2013 Leave a comment

Censorship. It’s an emotive word. And always wrong, right? Wrong.

You see, people confuse censorship with choice. And when it’s really a question of choice, it cannot be wrong. Consider the recent ‘censorship’ of hard core self-published books by organizations like WH Smith and Amazon. Amos Kepler wrote (14 October 2013):

My books have been banned by WHSmith… If anything, the books being controversial is one more important reason to sell them and feature them. Censorship and oppression of free expression are never okay!
My books have been banned by WHSmith

SM Johnson wrote (13 October 3013):

Well. It seems one of my books has been censored by Amazon… This is one of those “big bads” that NEEDS to be publicized. If we ever needed a shit-storm about anything, it’s THIS.
Erotica Authors – Amazon Censorship Alert

But this isn’t censorship, this is choice. It is the choice of the publisher (in this instance WH Smith and Amazon) to sell or provide what they choose (or in this case, not sell what they don’t choose). We would not describe Harrods’ disinclination to sell Happy Shopper beans as censorship of baked beans requiring a shit-storm of protest — so why should we do so about WH Smith and Amazon? After all, you can still get Happy Shopper beans from Happy Shopper — and you can still get hard core from hard core shops.

Censorship is different. It is the removal of choice. It does not say, you cannot have this from us; it says no-one can have this from anyone, at all, period — and with censorship, WH Smith and Amazon would have no choice over what they wish to sell or not sell. There’s a big difference.

WH Smith and Amazon are not censoring these books; they do not have the ability to do so (the books will be available elsewhere, even if only from the authors’ own websites). WH Smith and Amazon are choosing not to make them available from their sites. And it is their right to make that choice.

Censorship is when an organization prevents all access to information or ideas or art that would otherwise be available. Governments can do it. ISPs can do it. Bookshops cannot.

So if we go back to our first paragraph, censorship is always wrong, right? Right! But choice is not; and we should not confuse the two. Claiming that a bookseller’s decision not to sell a particular book is censorship weakens the argument against genuine, serious censorship. Genuine censorship is not merely wrong, it is dangerous. Bookshops deciding not to sell hard core is not censorship.

Categories: All, Politics

Major security group suppresses report from major security firm

July 8, 2013 Leave a comment

A little while back I did a report on a major analysis by a major security firm on a major malware campaign. The security firm mentioned the name of a major security group situate in a major world economy. The malware campaign seemed to originate from this major world economy and primarily target one other specific country. The security group’s name repeatedly appeared in the code of the malware being investigated. All of this is fact.

A few days later I asked a separate security firm, whom I knew to be also investigating the same malware campaign, for their thoughts. We’d rather not comment, was the reply, since this is already causing problems.


Well, this major analysis report now seems to have disappeared from the major security firm’s website.

Why would that be?

I hardly think that legal threats from the major security group would be enough – after all, the major security firm was merely presenting facts. The major security group’s name really does appear in the malware code, repeatedly. Anyway, the analysis report went to great lengths to say, paraphrased, “we are in no way suggesting that [major security group] is implicated by this – there could be many innocent reasons for the name to appear.”

But the report has disappeared. There’s still an entry in the major security firm’s blog that describes the malware campaign. But the major security group’s name doesn’t appear. A link points to the report, but just goes to the home page. The report itself seems to have disappeared.

Why would that be?

There are two reasons I can think of. The first is that the major security firm now accepts that the inclusion of the major security group’s name is coincidental and unrelated to reality. But then why not just say so, rather than removing the whole report?

The other is government pressure. The whole malware campaign reeks of state-sponsored cyber espionage. And if that’s the case, I can fully understand said major world economy applying government-level pressure against said major security firm to bury any implied suggestion of cyber espionage against the target country.

So this morning I received this email. “I am Mr Thing, Corporate Communication Manager of Major Security Group. I had earlier also sent you the mail but I did not got any response from your end.” He hadn’t, but we’ll let that pass. “There is an article on your website which says… I want to clarify you that the claims in the report were totally false and imaginative.” I don’t think so – they were a report of a matter of fact. And it’s not my website – it is the website of the magazine I was writing for. Out of loyalty to that magazine, and courtesy to the major security firm that has buckled under pressure and removed the report, I mention no names. But I should point out to Mr Thing that had I published my report on this website, it would remain in full with his email appended in full, and the major security firm’s major analysis of the major malware campaign appended to that.

Mr Thing also added, “So, I want you to remove the link from your website as it is defamatory, libellous, ethnically objectionable.” I would say to Mr Thing, corporate communications manager of major security group in major world economy, I take a very dim view of being accused of writing things that are defamatory, libelous and ethnically objectionable. In fact, I consider that to be defamatory.

Where do these people get off thinking they can suppress fact and rewrite history?

Categories: All, Politics, Security Issues

The law is an ass

May 5, 2013 1 comment

It’s worth repeating. The law is an ass. 

A fundamental purpose of law is to protect the individual. Sadly, this purpose has long since been appropriated by big business – the purpose of the law is now to pander for business at the expense of the citizen through the collusion of politicians.

The result is that the law has become ridiculous.

In the past it used to be an unwritten rule in the UK that parliament would not pass unenforceable laws. The reason is that a law that cannot be enforced makes the law look an ass. Worse, it makes parliament look as big an ass as the law that cannot be enforced.

Here’s an example. Parliament has created the laws that made the courts attempt to block The Pirate Bay (TPB) at the behest of the music industry (and film and video and video gaming etcetera). Parliament has become the pimp of the music industry (ironic, really, since neither prostitution nor the employment of prostitutes is illegal – because it is unenforceable – but pimping is illegal).

But back to The Pirate Bay. The courts have been forced by the alliance of parliament and the music industry to order the ISPs to block TPB. But blocking TPB is so unenforceable it is absurd; confirming that the law and parliament has become a collective ass.

The easiest way to get round the block is to use a proxy service. You go to a site in a country that doesn’t operate a block, and that website redirects you to TPB. A quick search on Google turned up at least 150 TPB proxies.

But you don’t even need to look for them. There’s a Chrome add-on and an Android app that will do it for you automatically.

If you don’t use Chrome and don’t have Android you could use TOR, which will both provide anonymity and bypass the block. Or use a VPN. Both of these require some effort and a little knowledge.

So you could simply switch to the Opera browser and turn on Turbo mode. Turbo mode is designed for users with slow connections. It speeds things up by going via Opera’s own servers. But since you are going to Opera rather than TPB, you don’t get blocked when you go through Opera Turbo to get to TPB.


The Pirate Bay, via Turbo Opera, from the UK

The Pirate Bay, via Turbo Opera, from the UK


This is TPB via Opera Turbo from the UK today. Note that although I asked for (Sweden), I automatically got redirected to TPB’s latest home at dotSX. TPB moved from Sweden to “Sint Maarten, a tiny island in the northeast Caribbean located 190 miles east of Puerto Rico,” a few days ago (TorrentFreak). This follows the latest court case in Sweden against TPB by the music industry. Incidentally, TPB also has an Icelandic domain. The music industry case in Sweden is trying to get the Icelandic domain closed because it is registered to a man of Swedish nationality. I salute Marius Olafsson of Iceland’s domain registry ISNIC, who told TorrentFreak: “ISNIC will legally fight attempts to use the domain name registry system to police/censor the net. We believe that to be ineffective, wrong and dangerous to the stability of the DNS as a whole.”

Or you could simply use the Google cache. Chrome direct:


The Pirate Bay direct – as blocked by UK ISPs

The Pirate Bay direct – as blocked by UK ISPs


Google’s cache:


The Pirate Bay via Google cache from the UK

The Pirate Bay via Google cache from the UK


The long and the short of it is that the UK blockade of The Pirate Bay (or any other website) is unenforceable.

Only about 30% of the UK electorate bothered to vote in last Thursday’s local elections. Pompous political spinners try to tell us that it’s mid-term and people are more concerned with national rather than local issues. I give them an alternative – the people are totally disillusioned with politics and politicians and the whole political process because the law and parliament has become an ass in the pocket of big business.

And that’s a tragedy.

Categories: All, Politics, Security Issues

Protect your local ISP

May 4, 2013 Leave a comment

Lisa Vaas, a journalist I respect, has an interesting post on NakedSecurity. It discusses the problem of revenge porn sites, and the distress and harm they can cause.

In particular, it highlights the cases of Holly Jacobs and a separate class action by 17 women against one particular site, and GoDaddy for hosting the site. Lisa is right in that something must be done about revenge porn – nobody has the right to inflict pain on any other person. But what to do is the problem.

Lisa supports the action against GoDaddy:

The notion of GoDaddy being taken to task hardly seems confused. It seems appropriate, the hosting provider being an accessory to the alleged crimes and having profited off them, to boot.

This is an understandable but dangerous reaction. ISPs and hosting companies must not become tasked with censoring what they host unless it is clearly and plainly illegal (and even then the alleged criminal site should have clear legal recourse to appeal and be reinstated if it is not illegal).

If GoDaddy is found liable for the content of the websites it hosts, where will it stop? There’s a conceptually similar case in Belgium, where the music rights group SABAM is suing ISPs for lost revenue through illegal music downloads, and also demanding a general 3.4% tax levy on users to pay for illegal downloads.

If cases like these succeed, then ISPs will become afraid of legal action against them whenever a hosted site publishes material that might offend or upset powerful vested interests: ISPs will err on the side of bland to protect their revenue, and freedom and liberty will take a serious hit. ISPs must be protected conduits, like snail mail, and not be responsible for what they carry.

Lisa is right that something needs to be done about revenge porn sites – but the target must be the people who post the material, not the sites themselves and most certainly not the ISPs and hosting companies.

Categories: All, Politics, Security Issues